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Climbing Mount Mitigation: A Proposal for
Legislative Suspension of Climate Change
"Mitigation Litigation"
J.B. Ruhl*
Because it’s there.1
To me, the only way you achieve a summit is to come back alive. The job
is half done if you don't get down again.2
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1. In March 1923, in an interview with The New York Times, the British mountaineer
George Leigh Mallory gave this response when asked why he wanted to climb Mount Everest,
which no person had successfully accomplished. The answer became famous, particularly after
Mallory and his fellow climber Andrew Irvine were lost on Everest in the following year. It was
unclear whether they perished on the way up to or down from the summit. See Interview,
Climbing Mount Everest is Work for Supermen, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1923, at X11,
available at http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/mallory?view=uk
(last visited November 5, 2009).
2. In May 1999, Mallory’s body was found on Everest, reigniting the question of
whether or not he or Irvine had reached the summit 29 years before Sir Edmund Hillary's
successful climb. Mallory's son, John Mallory, offered this objective view of the implications of
the finding of his father’s body. See AskOxford.com, A Quote from George Leigh Mallory,
http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/ mallory/?view=uk (last visited
November 5, 2009).
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I. Introduction

What is the United States’ climate change policy? Nobody knows. To be
sure, there is plenty of talk and even some action, the latter mostly by states
with the federal government moving slowly behind,3 but there could be no
plausible claim that the United States, and by this I mean federal, state, local,
tribal, and private actors from top to bottom—has formulated anything
approaching a coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national climate change
policy.4
Formulating such a policy, even with what appears to be new-found
political will at all governance levels, will be no mean feat. Critical and as yet
unanswered questions are most pressing at the federal scale: How will U.S.
policy interface with international and other national regimes? What form
should comprehensive federal legislation take—cap and trade, carbon taxes,
regulation, subsidies, something else? Should federal initiatives promote or
preempt state and local climate change policies? All these questions, however,
focus on federal policy initiatives taken through new laws and new regulations
implementing them.
This Article focuses on a different but related fundamental policy design
question: How should federal agencies implement existing statutory authorities
to contribute to a coherent national climate change policy? One might ask why
we should be concerned with how existing laws can be employed given
reasonable expectations that the Obama Administration and Congress are
3. See Patrick A. Parenteau, Lead Follow or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle
Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, (July 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1438180 (surveying the efforts of various states on
climate change).
4. See Geoffrey Clemm & Mark Griffin Smith, Emerging U.S. Climate Change Policy:
Where We are and How We Got Here, (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440339 (surveying the history and current landscape of national
climate change policy).
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poised to make gains on new federal initiatives. For several reasons, however,
it is unlikely that even bold new federal legislation—a comprehensive carbon
tax on all fossil fuel consumption or a cap-and-trade program broadly
encompassing major emission sources—will obviate the need to solve the
puzzle of how to integrate existing laws into the picture. First, it is unlikely
that new federal legislation aimed at reducing national greenhouse gas
emissions will alone allow us to meet our nation’s appropriate share (whatever
that is) of global reductions necessary to wrestle climate change under control
(whatever that level is). Second, regardless of how aggressively the federal
government regulates greenhouse gas emissions through some new legislative
program, the global climate system will face a period of “committed warming”
resulting from the buildup of past emissions in the troposphere.5 In short,
something more than new federal emission reduction programs will be needed
to reduce emissions (known as mitigation), and something entirely different
from emission reduction programs will be needed to respond to the climate
change we inevitably will experience regardless of mitigation success (known
as adaptation).6
As we look around for that something more, new state and local policy
initiatives surely come to mind as ways to fill the gap, but why not also turn to
existing federal environmental and other legislation? Of course, for close to a
5. See V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference
with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 105, 14245 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4oC even if
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible
Climate Change due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 1704
(2009) (estimating a 1000-year committed warming effect); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 19,
Cambridge University Press, (April 2–5, 2007); available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (“Past emissions are estimated to involve some unavoidable
warming . . . even if atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels.”);
Professor Eric Biber has provided an in-depth examination of this lag effect and the resistance it
is likely to generate against costly policy measures that may take decades to produce results. See
Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009) ().
6. Broadly speaking, in the language of climate change policy mitigation means polices
designed to arrest climate change and adaptation means policies designed to deal with the
climate change we either do not or cannot mitigate. See generally, Robin Kundis Craig, Climate
Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now What? (discussing the terms mitigation and
adaptation in terms of the distinct policy needs and approaches of each); see also Robin Kundis
Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/=1357766 (outlining general guidelines for formulating adaptation
strategies).
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decade some federal agencies, many interest groups, and a growing number of
legal academics have been doing just that, but not in any systematic way. Our
federal “policy” for how to employ existing legislative authorities such as the
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National
Environmental Policy Act to combat and respond to climate change has been
shaped primarily by ad hoc agency policy studies, scatter-shot interest group
litigation aimed at forcing agencies to do something or to prevent them from
doing anything, and all variety of proposals in legal scholarship, which is to say
there is no policy at all. It is thus little surprise that the EPA Office of Inspector
General recently found that “EPA does not have an overall plan to ensure
developing consistent, compatible climate change strategies across the
Agency.”7 I leave it to others to assign blame for that lack of cohesive federal
policy initiatives on climate change to date. The Obama Administration
presents opportunities for a fresh start, and my aim here is to put existing
federal regulatory programs at the heart of any effort the Administration
activates to forge a comprehensive national climate change policy.
Three overarching concerns strike me as complicating and constraining the
role of existing authorities in that regard. First, at least for the foreseeable
future agencies most likely will have to rely on existing legislation as currently
in place to define the scope of authority. Congress is unlikely soon in any
systematic and comprehensive way to “update” existing legislation to take
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals into account. For one thing, the
political game in Congress on climate change for now, if there is one, is about
enacting new comprehensive emission reduction legislation. But even with that
task eventually behind it, Congress is likely to take up the Supreme Court’s
suggestion in Massachusetts v. EPA8 that existing legislation can be sufficiently
7. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 09-P-0089, EPA
NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PLAN AND POLICIES TO FULFILL ITS EMERGING CLIMATE
CHANGE
ROLE,
AT
A
GLANCE
(2009),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/20090202-09-P-0089.pdf.
8. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had erred in denying a citizen rulemaking
petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles as an air pollutant under the
Clean Air Act). See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (defining “air pollutant” in
sweeping terms to include “any air pollution agent . . . including any physical, chemical [or]
biological . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”).
The EPA dismissed the petition on the broad basis that global climate change is so complicated
either Congress did not provide for greenhouse gas emissions to be subject matter for the Clean
Air Act or, if Congress did so provide, the agency properly identified conflicting policy
concerns as a basis for deciding not to regulate emissions. See Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003). The Court
rejected those rationales as outside the scope of the statute and found that “greenhouse gasses fit
well within [the] capacious definition” of air pollutant. 549 U.S. at 500. For concise yet
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flexible to accommodate development of climate change mitigation and
adaptation policy through administrative reform initiatives.9 Why would
Congress expend the political capital necessary to update the laws if agencies
can accomplish the same through administrative interpretation and
implementation of existing laws?
Leaving matters to agencies, however, raises the two additional concerns:
What is the scope of agency discretion under existing laws to formulate
mitigation and adaptation policies, and how aggressively should any such
authority be exercised? Appallingly, these two root questions are being
addressed only through piecemeal interest group litigation and disjointed
agency policy initiatives. The time, thus, is ripe for the Obama Administration
to conduct a systematic, government-wide assessment of the climate change
policy discretion inherent in existing federal legislation and to develop a
coordinated plan for exercising it.
This Article highlights the need for such an initiative and proposes a
framework for carrying it out. Part I focuses on the dysfunctional effects
litigation designed to force agencies into regulating greenhouse gas emissions
under existing laws, what I call “mitigation litigation,” is likely to have on
agency policy development. As strong proponents of mitigation litigation have
described their agenda, it is simply that “we must launch a thousand arrows
immediately.”10 And they have been launched. For example, with over $6
million of funding already committed, the Center for Biological Diversity
recently formed the Climate Law Institute to, among other things, “establish
legal precedents requiring existing environmental laws such as the Clean Air
Act, Endangered Species Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water
Act, and the California Environmental Quality Act to be fully implemented to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.”11 Even disregarding the inherently poor
thorough summaries of the rulemaking petition, the EPA’s decision, lower court proceedings,
the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions, and the likely impact of the case, see
Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources –
Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10535 (2007); see also Michael
Sugar, Case Comment, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 531 (2007).
9. See 549 U.S. at 532 (“While the Congresses that drafted [Clean Air Act] might not
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language . . . reflects an
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.”)
10
Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and Boiling: Endangered Species Act
Turning Down the Heat, 44 TULSA L. REV. 205, 230 (2008).
11. Center for Biological Diversity, Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity
Announces Climate Law Institute, Dedicates $17 Million to Combat Global Warming (Feb. 12,
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attributes of litigation for making national policy in general—i.e., that it is not
transparent, it limits public participation, it is piecemeal, it can lead to
inconsistent results, it takes a long time to reach conclusion, etc.—mitigation
litigation is an especially awful platform for developing national climate change
policy. Using the Endangered Species Act as a case study, I argue that, while it
has pushed a few agencies into examining the role of existing authorities,
mitigation litigation in the long run will lead to an uncoordinated and
ineffective climate change policy. Existing legislation, if creatively applied
within the bounds of permissible agency statutory interpretation, offers many
opportunities for agencies to pursue mitigation and adaptation policies, but not
all such opportunities necessarily should be employed to the maximum an
agency’s policy discretion might allow. The pursuit of mitigation litigation
against federal agencies has been designed to push them into emissions
mitigation regulation “because it’s there,” with no clear vision of how to do so
at the agency level and no plan for how to coordinate a government-wide
climate change policy initiative that includes both mitigation and adaptation.
Targeting agencies with this kind of mitigation litigation forces the federal
government to build a mitigation policy through ad hoc, agency-by-agency
litigation. To be sure, in the George W. Bush Administration, mitigation
litigation under existing laws moved some agencies off center and in the
direction of formulating climate change policies. Indeed, Massachusetts v.
EPA may in retrospect be seen as the jolt needed to put existing laws in play in
the climate change policy dialogue. But continuing down the mitigation
litigation path will not bring about a coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national
climate change policy.
Part II of the Essay suggests a way out of this trap. I propose federal
legislation that would suspend for two years all causes of action against
agencies designed to force them to develop climate change policies under
existing legislation. During this period agencies would conduct coordinated
statutory and policy studies, develop and finalize regulatory proposals, and
suggest legislative amendments, after which any litigation about the final
regulations would be channeled through a prescribed judicial review forum.
Necessary interim agency decisions, such as preparation of environmental
impact statements and issuance of permits, would to the maximum extent
practicable and permitted by law be made contingent on the outcome of the rule
promulgations. This process would allow agencies to get out from under the
2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2009/climate-law-institute-0212-2009.html. One of the co-authors of Moritz et al. is the Director of the Center’s Climate
Law Institute, and another co-author is a staff member of the Center. See Moritz et al., supra
note 10, at 205 n.n.aa1—aaa1.
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perverse mitigation litigation cloud while formulating climate change policy in
a coordinated government-wide process.
Our nation needs to climb Mount Mitigation, but it also needs to come
back down intact. A national climate change policy “map” is desperately
needed. It must chart paths for mitigation and adaptation. It must locate new
and existing authorities at all levels of government. Existing federal laws will
play a large role in charting overall mitigation and adaptation objectives, but
not if we stumble along step-by-step guided by piecemeal, ad hoc mitigation
litigation. As important as citizen suit and Administrative Procedure Act
litigation has been to the development of environmental policy over time, it is
far too costly, time-consuming, disjointed, and contentious a manner to
formulate the kind of mitigation policy the nation should expect our
government to produce in the time frame needed. Rather, the political stars
seem aligned such that, if given the chance, federal administrative agencies
could pull off a coordinated and probing examination of how best to use
existing authorities toward that end. My mitigation litigation suspension
proposal is designed to give them that opportunity
II. Mitigation Litigation – Pursuing Mitigation Because It’s There
I define mitigation litigation as any litigation effort designed to force an
agency to employ, or to not employ, existing regulatory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions or limit a regulated action on the basis of its
greenhouse gas emissions.12 As the Climate Law Institute’s mission statement
suggests, the primary fronts for the initiative have been the Clean Air Act,
Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental Policy Act. Thus far,
however, the first wave of mitigation litigation has produced very little
mitigation regulation policy. To be sure, courts have interpreted existing
statutes to require agencies to integrate climate change into decision making,
but they have imposed no particular outcome. For example, the Supreme Court
in Massachusetts v. EPA pushed the agency toward regulating greenhouse gas
12. There is, of course, a much broader range of climate change litigation. A useful
depiction of the breadth and depth of climate change litigation can be found at a chart lawyers at
the law firm of Arnold & Porter has prepared. See Michael B. Gerrard and J. Cullen Howe,
Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., 2009, http://www.climatecasechart.com. The chart
divides climate change into three primary categories: statutory claims; common law claims; and
public international claims. Within the statutory claims category are claims to force the
government to act, claims to stop government action, and claims to regulate private conduct. My
mitigation litigation category corresponds most closely to the chart’s claims to force government
to act category.
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automobile emissions under the Clean Air Act, but observed that “EPA no
doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content and coordination
of its regulations with those of other agencies.”13 Clearly, the Climate Law
Institute effort is designed to focus the next litigation thrust on shaping the
policies the EPA and other agencies develop now that they know they cannot so
easily avoid making decisions about how to address climate change under their
authorizing statutes. As valuable as the first wave of mitigation litigation was
for putting existing laws on the climate change policy playing board, however,
the launching of the second wave portends only folly.
Nowhere is the potential fallout from this single-minded litigation-led
quest for the mitigation peak more evident than in the debate over how to
integrate the Endangered Species Act (ESA) into climate change policy. I
previously have outlined the scope of discretion agencies have under the
existing ESA to engage in climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures.14 Like the Clean Air Act and most other existing environmental
laws, the ESA does not mention climate change but is riddled with provisions
that offer varying ranges of discretion to agencies to formulate climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies, making it a sitting duck for mitigation
litigation. In particular, Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency (…“action agency”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined . . . to be critical . . . .15

The statute and implementing regulations build an elaborate procedure for
carrying out these consultations under which the agency proposing the action
(known as the “action agency”) must consult with, depending on the species,
either the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) through a series of steps designed to predict the impact of the
action on listed species, with the ultimate product being a “biological opinion”
from the FWS or NMFS “setting forth the [agency’s] opinion, and a summary

13. 549 U.S. at 533.
14. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). The provision also requires that “[i]n fulfilling the
requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data
available.” Id.
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of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency
action affects the species or its critical habitat.”16
The substantive content for conducting the consultation analysis is defined
primarily in joint FWS/NMFS regulations. “Jeopardize” is defined there as “to
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of
that species.”17 “Action” is defined as “all activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in
the United States or upon the high seas.”18 “Effects of the action” include “the
direct and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together
with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with
that action, that will be added to the environmental baseline.”19 The “indirect
effects” are “those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time,
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”20
On the one hand, greenhouse gas emissions and their climate change
consequences arguably can be plausibly fit into this framework. Greenhouse
gas emissions from actions carried out, funded, or authorized by federal
agencies contribute to tropospheric warming, the indirect effects of which could
at some later time adversely affect a protected species. Although determining
whether these effects actually occur may be difficult to do reliably in particular
scenarios, the point is that they could occur.
On the other hand, there are considerable legal, scientific, and practical
difficulties with fitting climate change into the consultation framework at the
level of detail necessary to evaluate particular federal agency actions, even
relatively large or programmatic actions. Consider, for example, a proposed
coal-fired power plant in Florida and its effects on the polar bear in the Arctic.
The argument for applying the ESA goes as follows: the power plant emits
greenhouse gases (a direct effect of the action), greenhouse gases are
reasonably certain to warm the troposphere (an indirect effect of the action), a
warming troposphere is reasonably certain to adversely alter ecological
conditions for the polar bear, and it is reasonably expected that such ecological
changes will bring an end to the polar bear as a species.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While that chain of events makes for an easy connect-the-dots story, in
fact any effort to link the individual plant’s emissions as the jeopardizing agent
for the polar bear species would meet obvious objections stemming from the
fact that all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide are subject to the same causal
analysis. Acting through an incredibly complex temporal and spatial causal
chain beginning over a century ago, all greenhouse gas molecules are equally to
blame for whatever impact climate change has on a species. It is not possible,
therefore, to “upscale” current emissions from a particular source and
“downscale” them in real time to a particular impact on the ground, which is
precisely what the Section 7 consultation process would require the FWS and
NMFS to do for every action funded, carried out, or authorized by federal
agencies.21 As a federal court recently explained in deciding the causation
requirement of Article III standing had not been met in a claim that current
greenhouse gas emissions are causing a public nuisance:
The undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas emissions from all global
sources and their worldwide accumulation over long periods of time . . .
makes clear that there is no realistic probability of tracing any particular
alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific
person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time . . . . [T]he genesis
of global warming is attributable to numerous entities which individually
and cumulatively over the span of centuries created the effects . . . . [I]t Is
not plausible to state which emissions—emitted by whom and at what time
in the last several centuries and at what place in the world—“caused . . .
alleged global warming related injuries.22

21. Moritz et al. argue that “[j]ust as there is no requirement to link the thinning of any
particular bald eagle egg to any particular molecule of DDT to demonstrate that authorization of
the use of DDT may result in a taking of bald eagles, there is no requirement to link any
particular molecule of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse pollutant to the death of an individual
bear.” Moritz et al, supra note 10, at 226. The difference, of course, is that DDT is ingested by
and toxic to bald eagles, whereas carbon dioxide is not the lethal agent in the case of the polar
bear. A complex spatially and temporally attenuated causal chain involving the planet’s vast
physical system exists between the emission of a molecule of a greenhouse gas and its climate
change effect on a polar bear. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE CHALLENGES OF
LINKING CARBON EMISSIONS, ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS,
GLOBAL
WARMING,
AND
CONSEQUENTIAL
IMPACTS,
(2008),
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2008/
polarbear012308/pdf/Memo_to_FWSPolar_Bears.PDF.
22. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, No. C 08-1138 SBA, slip op. at 13
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). The Fifth Circuit recently criticized this reasoning as improperly
conflating the merits of the nuisance claim with the causation requirement of standing, in that
the standing requirement “need not be as close as the proximate causation needed to succeed on
the merits of a tort claim.” Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756, slip op. at 5 (5th Cir. Oct.
16, 2009). No court has yet reached the merits of such a claim.

CLIMBING MOUNT MITIGATION

81

Every source of greenhouse gas emissions funded, carried out, or
authorized by a federal agency, therefore, is on the same footing with respect to
causation of jeopardy for a climate-threatened species. In other words, going
down the mitigation road with Section 7 would subject a vast segment of our
nation’s economy to greenhouse gas regulation under the ESA, with no
principled way of distinguishing between emission sources for purposes of
assigning “jeopardizing” causal status. Either all federal actions would trigger
jeopardy status and be subject to regulation by the FWS and NMFS,23 or the
FWS and NMFS would have to adopt arbitrary thresholds for assigning
jeopardy status (e.g., quantity or efficiency of emissions) that would face
difficult legal challenges.
Indeed, the suggestion that Section 7 could, in Clean Air Act like fashion,
arbitrarily apply only to “major” greenhouse gas emission sources but lay off
the small ones fundamentally misses the basic theme of the jeopardy
prohibition. Moritz et al. argue, for example, that the FWS and NMFS “could
set a threshold level for consultation, as long as it was reasonable and
sufficiently protective of listed species.”24 But they do not point to authority in
Section 7 or elsewhere in the ESA for differentiating between sources in terms
of legal status if there is no scientific basis for differentiating the sources’
causal status. The regulatory definition of jeopardy, they point out, is “to
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species in the wild,”25 which they suggest opens the door to an emissions level
threshold. But consider how “appreciably” would be measured once a species
is in jeopardy of not surviving and recovering. Jeopardy itself can be thought
of as a threshold the ESA prohibits federal agencies from crossing based on the
status of the species in question. After a species is listed, it is not the case that
no further degradation of the species’ condition or its habitat is permitted.
Rather, the “incidental take authorization” procedures of Sections 7 and 10
allow public and private actions to cause harm and even death to individuals of
the species with FWS and NMFS approval, with the jeopardy prohibition of
Section 7 acting as a threshold of maximum tolerance.26 Hence, in reality there
23. Regulation by the FWS and NMFS comes in the form of the agencies specifying
“reasonable and prudent” alternatives to the action as proposed. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
Presumably, in the climate change mitigation context this would mean placing caps on emission
levels. Proponents of this use of the ESA have yet to explain how the FWS and NMFS would
establish such caps for different sources.
24. Moritz et al., supra note 10, at 228.
25. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added).
26. Section 9 of the ESA requires that all persons, including all private and public entities
subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of fish and wildlife.16
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for what
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is an increment of “likelihood of survival and recovery” that additional federal
and nonfederal actions erode through these incidental take authorizations. At
some point, that increment is sufficiently eroded that the next action requiring
incidental take authorization would trigger a jeopardy finding regardless of its
“size.” In the polar bear’s case, in other words, conditions could reach the
point that the species can tolerate no additional net increase in emissions of
greenhouse gases without moving the likelihood of survival and recovery
dangerously close to zero. At that point, if we want to entertain this causal
story at the micro scale of discrete land uses, zero additional emissions of
greenhouse gases from any source could escape a jeopardy finding.
Moreover, the idea that the ESA can differentiate between “major” and
“minor” sources, regulating the former and leaving the latter outside the scope
of consultation, turns the “cumulative effects” problem on its head in violation
of Section 7. If Moritz et al. believe establishing causation is not a problem for
applying Section 7 to emissions from “major” sources, then it follows that it
also is not a problem for applying Section 7 to the cumulative effects of
“minor” sources. Rarely does one hear environmental protection interest
groups lobby in favor of an exemption from Section 7 for projects destroying
under 20 acres of forest habitat of an endangered bird, or for projects diverting
under 10 acre feet of water for an endangered fish, or for projects releasing
under 10 pounds of pesticides for an endangered reptile. I wouldn’t either.
Why, then, would anyone be comfortable regulating only “major” sources of
greenhouse gas emissions under the ESA, other than as an expedient to regulate
major sources of greenhouse gas emissions and avoid the political and legal
complications of regulating all causal sources? Why would greenhouse gas
emissions from, say, hundreds of thousands of farms receiving federal subsidies
not cross the jeopardy threshold but emissions from a single large power plant
would?
Moritz et al. overlook that Section 7 regulations specifically prohibit this
distortion by requiring that cumulative impacts be considered. The precise
question under review in a Section 7 consultation is whether “the action, taken
constitutes “take,” see Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions
of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001) Steven P. Quarles & Thomas
R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and
the “Harm” Regulation?, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 207
(Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002). Sections 7 (for federal agency actions) and 10
(for actions not subject to Section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for FWS to approve
“incidental take” of listed species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) and 1539(a)(1). “Incidental take,”
although not explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is described in section 10 of the
statute as take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of listed species.”27 Cumulative effects are “those effects of future State or
private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to
occur within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation,”28 and
the action area includes “all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the
Federal action and not just the immediate area involved in the action.”29 This
means that for greenhouse gas emission sources, if Section 7 is applied to them,
the action area is the entire planet and thus all greenhouse emissions from all
sources subject to United States jurisdiction anywhere in the world would have
to be included in the cumulative effects component of the consultation.30
Rather obviously, no source, no matter how small, could escape a jeopardy
finding under this causal reasoning once the cumulative effects sources are
factored into the consultation. In short, there is no way under Section 7 to have
your cake and eat it too; if one believes greenhouse gas emissions can be
regulated under Section 7 notwithstanding the tenuous causal theory supporting
that view, every source of greenhouse gas emissions the federal government
carries out, funds, or authorizes will, because of how cumulative effects and the
action area are defined, be found to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both
the survival and recovery of all climate-threatened listed species in the world.
My suggestion that this application of Section 7 is not a practical use of
the ESA and should be avoided to the extent permitted under the agencies’
discretion has been met with accusations that I am “rationaliz[ing] for a
preferred policy approach rather than a meritorious legal argument.”31 This
critique seems out of place with the recognition, endorsed by a long list of
environmental law professors, that “there is a legitimate debate to be had over
how well the current structure of the ESA serves to address climate change in
general, or climate change impacts on listed species in particular,” and that “it
is unclear whether consultation would halt…power plants, require significant
changes to the projects, or have no impact at all.”32 Other legal commentary
recognizes the difficulties of establishing the necessary causation under the
ESA and suggests that either my or the Moritz et al. perspective finds plausible
27. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). A consultation thus must “evaluate the effects of the action
and cumulative effects on the listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3). Id. § 402.02.
28. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
29. Id.
30. The ESA applies broadly to all federal, state, local, tribal, and private entities,
including individuals, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
31. Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 227.
32. Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conversation: Amended ESA Section 7
Regulations Put Species At Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139, 147 (2009)
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support in ESA law.33 Proponents of using the ESA as the lynchpin of our
nation’s greenhouse gas regulation regime thus seem no less susceptible to the
charge of preferring a policy outcome than am I. Moritz et al. suggest, for
example, that “[o]nly by fully implementing the ESA to help avoid rapid and
catastrophic climate change can we keep it the strongest and most relevant
biodiversity protection statute that the world has ever seen,”34 and that “[t]here
is absolutely no reason why we should not require these agencies to adopt all
feasible measures to reduce emissions immediately through the Section 7
process,”35 but that is just their “preferred policy approach.”
I make no bones about my “preferred policy approach;”it is to promote the
ESA as one of the nation’s focused climate change adaptation statutes, for
which I argue the ESA is especially well designed, and leave greenhouse gas
emission regulation to agencies that are better equipped at pollution control
science and technology, such as the EPA.36 The question boils down to
whether my “preferred policy approach” fits within the range of discretion the
FWS and the NMFS enjoy under Section 7; that is, whether courts would find
the agencies’ position that causation cannot be established within the meaning
of Section 7 is a reasonable interpretation of the statute entitled to judicial

33. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR BEAR
LISTING TO FORCE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 3–5
(2008) (laying out the legal basis for both positions); Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the
Endangered Species Act: The Difficulty of Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 171–82
(2009) (detailing the causation obstacles to using section 7 to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions). But see Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull Off the Leash: Siccing the
Endangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 303–04, 307–08
(2009) (arguing in the extreme that there is no significant obstacle to proving causation in a
claim that greenhouse gas emissions cause take of an identifiable member of a species in
violation of section 9).
34. Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 230.
35. Id. at 225.
36. Finding the “assertion that scientists and managers within the Services do not have the
expertise to analyze greenhouse gas emission in section 7 consultations particularly puzzling,”
Moritz et al. presumably believe that the FWS and NMFS either already have or should be
empowered with the pollution modeling and control technology design expertise needed to
regulate the nation’s sources of greenhouse gas pollutants. Id. at 227. While I agree that, with
sufficient time and funding, the FWS and the NMFS could duplicate EPA’s pollution regulation
expertise, I am suggesting that it makes no practical sense to do so as a means of engaging the
ESA in the nation’s climate change policy strategy when so much more can be done using the
agencies’ existing capacities toward assisting species in adapting to climate change. In any
event, the fact of the matter is that, at present, neither the FWS nor the NMFS purports to have
or exercise the expertise needed to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the industrial and
agricultural complex of the entire United States, which is what going down the path Moritz et al.
propose would require.
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deference. I believe a “meritorious legal argument” can be made that they
would.
To be sure, under my approach the FWS and NMFS would have no room
to dodge the ESA’s mandate at least to consider the effects of climate change
on actions and species as part of the environmental baseline required to be
accounted for in all consultations under Section 7.37 That is, after all, a
necessary ingredient of using the ESA to assist species adaptation. The
mitigation litigation cause wants much more, however, and the reaction by the
Bush Administration was to launch a counter-offensive that sent the question of
the ESA and climate policy spiraling out of control.
The pushback began in full force in May 2008, when the FWS
promulgated a final rule listing the polar bear as threatened based on factors
that included the impacts of climate change on Arctic sea ice.38 Secretary of the
Interior Dirk Kempthorne stressed at the time that the listing would not provide
a basis for using the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
sources.39 The FWS also issued interim and final section 4(d) rules for the
polar bear, exempting from section 9 take prohibitions any activity already
exempt or authorized under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and, for any
activity outside of Alaska, also exempting all takes incidental to a lawful
purpose.40 The unspoken purpose of the latter approach undoubtedly was to cut
off claims that GHG emissions sources outside of Alaska are causing
unauthorized take of the polar bear. In tandem with that, the Department of the
Interior also issued a memorandum explaining it will not consider GHG
emissions in consultations about the polar bear or other species listed due to

37. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 368-70 (E.D. Cal.
2007) (The FWS must consider the effects of climate change on actions regulated under the
ESA). The environmental baseline in section 7 consultations refers to “the past and present
impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the
anticipated impacts of all proposed federal projects in the action area that have already
undergone…consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous
with the consultation in process.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. It is against this baseline that the
action under review is evaluated to determine its incremental effect. The impacts of climate
change attributable to those other actions, therefore, should be included in that baseline. The
baseline analysis operates at a macro level—i.e., all that matters is that the baseline takes climate
change impacts into account, not that it assign responsibility to specific sources.
38. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28212 (May 15, 2008).
39. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to
Protect Polar Bears under Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008).
40. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28306 (May 15, 2008) (interim rule); 73 Fed. Reg. 76249 (Dec. 16,
2008) (final rule).
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climate threats because tracing causation is, according to the highly respected
United States Geological Survey, scientifically impossible.41
The FWS and NMFS later followed up on that position by promulgating
new section 7(a)(2) consultation regulations designed to, among other things,
preclude consideration of greenhouse emissions in consultations. Culminating
one of the most controversial rulemakings in the history of ESA
implementation, in December 2008, the FWS and NMFS promulgated final
rules revising various features of the Section 7 consultation regulations. The
changes, too extensive to cover and assess in detail here, fell into three
categories: (1) revised and new definitions for the causation and effects
analyses; (2) revisions to applicability designed to preclude consideration of
GHG emissions in consultations; and (3) streamlined consultations through a
shift in decision authority to action agencies. Some of the changes merely
codified existing conditions, such as a new provision limiting consultations to
discretionary actions. But some had the potential to radically alter consultation
practice. Some significant changes included: indirect effects are limited to
those effects that occur later in time for which the proposed action is an
“essential cause;”42if an effect will occur whether or not the proposed action
takes place, it is not an indirect effect.;43 indirect effects must be reasonably
likely to occur based on “clear and substantial information;”44for actions not
anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the effects are
manifested through “global processes” that cannot be reliably predicted or
measured, have an insignificant impact, or pose only a remote risk;45for actions
not anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the effects are not
capable of being measured in a way that permits “meaningful evaluation;”46 and
action agencies will determine for themselves whether, under these new
standards, formal consultation is necessary.
The rule attracted considerable controversy: tens of thousands of
comments were filed on the proposed rule, and litigation was filed immediately
41. See Solicitor’s Opinion, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Guidance
on the Applicability of the Endangered Species Act’s Consultation Requirements to Proposed
Actions Involving the Emission of Greenhouse Gases (Oct. 3, 2008); Memorandum from the
Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, The Challenges of Linking Carbon
Emissions, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Global Warming, and Consequential
Impacts (May 14, 2008). The Department in the Obama Administration has not rescinded that
guidance.
42. 73 Fed. Reg. 76249, 76287 (Dec. 16, 2008).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 402.03(b)(2).
46. Id. § 402.03(b)(3)(i).
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to challenge the final rule. Many environmental strategists outlined ways the
Obama Administration could, through executive action or in concert with
Congress, swiftly nullify the rule. In March 2009 President Obama ordered
FWS and NMFS to review the rules and authorized other federal agencies “to
follow the prior longstanding consultation and concurrence practices.”47 Soon
thereafter Congress passed legislation allowing the agencies to withdraw the
polar bear section 4(d) rule and the consultation rule with no notice and
comment procedures,48 which the agencies did for the consultation rule
effective May 4, 2009.49 Other than raise a fuss about the Bush Administration
consultation rule, however, neither Congress nor the Obama Administration has
shown any interest in dragging the ESA into the war on greenhouse gas
emissions. Nothing in the legislation allowing the agencies to overturn the
rules or in the agencies’ statement accompanying the decision to overturn the
consultation rule so much as mentions using the ESA to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions. Indeed, all indications thus far suggest that interest groups
pursuing mitigation litigation under the ESA will not like the Obama
Administration's position much more than they did the Bush Administration's:
Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior David Hayes told senators
during his confirmation hearing that the endangered species law is ill-suited for
addressing greenhouse gas emissions; Tom Strickland, the Assistant Secretary
for Fish, Wildlife and Parks overseeing the ESA, said the same at his hearing;
and, more directly to the point, FWS spokesman Josh Winchell said in
February 2009 that “we have zero legislative authority to regulate carbon
emissions. That is just not what we do. With the polar bear, the science
definitely pointed to climate change, but that does not all of a sudden give us
the authority to address the underlying cause, which is carbon emissions.”50
Putting those words into action, on May 8, 2009, Interior Secretary Salazar
announced the agency’s decision not to rescind the polar section bear section
4(d) rule, proclaiming that “the Endangered Species Act is not the proper
mechanism for controlling our nation’s carbon emissions.”51
47. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies Re: The Endangered Species Act (Mar. 3, 2009).
48. 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. E, tit. IV, § 429, 123 Stat.
544, 749.
49. See 74 Fed. Reg. 20421 (May 4, 2009)
50. Greenwire, Endangered Species: Some See EPA’s Climate Proposal Prodding
Interior on ESA (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
print/2009/04/23/4; see also Alan Kovski, Interior Nominee Agrees Climate Change Fits Poorly
in Endangered Species Rules, 40 Env’t Rep. (Bureau of National Affairs, Arlington, VA) 605,
622 (Mar. 20, 2009).
51. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, News Release, Salazar Retains Conservation Rule for
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The point of recounting this history and the complexities of applying the
ESA to greenhouse gas emissions is that there has to be a better way of going
about integrating existing laws into a national climate change policy than
having interest groups and federal agencies flail about in piecemeal litigation
and defensive rulemakings. Federal agencies must act, but they ought to be
able to act at least initially without the specter of mitigation litigation looming.
A coordinated, multi-scalar national climate change policy is too important to
have in place, and soon, to allow it to be forged by courts interpreting existing
laws through ad hoc litigation around the nation. In the next section, I propose
a legislative suspension of mitigation litigation to facilitate development of such
a policy.
III. Designing a Systematic Climate Change Policy Development Process
President Obama’s appointment of Carol Browner as White House
Coordinator of Energy and Climate Policy is an important first step in forging a
coordinated national climate change policy, but neither President Obama nor
Ms. Browner can do much to stem mitigation litigation while she works toward
that end. Congress must step in for that part. As unlikely as it is that Congress
would choose to offend the lawyers and interest groups pursuing mitigation
litigation or to appear to be limiting public participation, the following proposal
outlines what I believe is a sensible approach to suspending mitigation
litigation while federal agencies are required to develop coordinated
rulemakings for activating existing laws to contribute to climate change
mitigation and litigation.
A. Suspending Climate Change Litigation Causes of Action
Step one of my proposal is for Congress and President Obama to enact
legislation suspending mitigation litigation for two years. This can be
accomplished one of two ways. One is to enact an omnibus provision
preventing any new or continued litigation using citizen suit or Administrative
Procedure Act causes of action to pursue mitigation litigation claims, that is to
force any federal agency to regulate or not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
or to develop or revise policies with respect to whether and how to regulate
Polar Bears, Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate Legislation (May 8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/
showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E0892D91701.
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greenhouse gas emissions. A more aggressive approach would be, in addition,
to suspend federal judicial jurisdiction over all such claims and remedies, so as
to prevent other types of litigation (e.g., common law claims) from somehow
leading to judicial orders violating the intent of the suspension. Alternatively,
or in tandem, the legislation could direct federal agencies not to develop or
revise climate change policies until they have completed the policy
development process outlined below.
B. Defining Climate Change Statutory Discretion Under Existing Laws
At the commencement of the suspension period, every federal agency
would have six months to produce for Congress and the President a report (a)
examining all potential authorities in existing laws it administers that could
support climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and the extent of
discretion available to the agency under each provision, (b) detailing the
agency’s decisions about how to exercise those authorities within its range of
discretion, (c) developing, through an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking,
draft regulations for implementing the agency’s vision, and (d) recommending
statutory amendments where necessary to provide more definitive or necessary
support for policies the agency believes should be pursued but for which
existing law does not provide authority.
C. Coordinated Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Rule
Promulgation
In the next six months of the suspension period, a task force appointed
pursuant to the terms of the legislation (e.g., relevant Department and agency
heads) and chaired by the White House Coordinator will use the reports
compiled by each agency and comments on the advanced notices of
rulemakings to develop a coordinated national policy for existing laws and will
evaluate each agency’s draft regulations to recommend any changes necessary
to allow the agency most usefully to contribute to the policy. During the second
year of the suspension period each agency then will propose regulations and
complete promulgation by the end of the two-year suspension period using
standard APA rule promulgation procedures. During the second year the task
force will also evaluate the statutory amendment recommendations of each
agency and report on them to Congress, and it will also outline policies for
integrating state, local, and tribal policy initiatives.
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D. Interim Decisions

During the suspension period, agencies of course will need to implement
existing laws, such as by issuing or denying permits, preparing environmental
impact statements, and carrying out, funding, and authorizing other actions. To
the extent permissible by law, all such actions will be contingent on the rules
adopted from the process, with provisions made for modification of permits,
funding conditions, and project design to bring all actions into compliance with
the new regulations as soon as practical. Federal agencies and non-federal
actors receiving federal funding or authorization may during this interim period
design actions to be consistent with what the federal agency believes is likely to
comply with its regulations. For any project that cannot legally include this
contingency and which is not voluntarily designed to anticipate compliance
requirements, the duration or magnitude of the agency action (e,g., the permit
period or funding level) will be the lowest allowed by applicable law so as to
ensure that the new rules, once in effect, can be applied to the next
discretionary decision whether to renew or revise the action.
E. Judicial Review
To ensure uniformity of judicial treatment of the rules produced from the
process and all decisions made during the suspension period that trigger the
interim contingency condition, judicial review of all rules promulgated through
the process and any claims collaterally challenging the new rules (e.g., a permit
challenge contesting the scope of the new rules) will be conducted directly in
the D.C. Circuit. The review standard for agency interpretations of the existing
statutory authorities on which the new rules are based will require the court to
apply the Chevron standard in all cases.
IV. Conclusion
I agree with the perspective that climate change requires that we will likely
need to “launch a thousand arrows,” but I do not agree that we must or should
do so “immediately.” Better, I believe, to take aim first, pull on the bow with
deliberation, and hit the target. To use another metaphor, better to draw up a
good map before climbing up Mount Mitigation. Yet the unchecked
continuation of mitigation litigation involves using no map at all. It was by all
accounts necessary to engage in mitigation litigation to push the Bush
Administration into acknowledging the need to integrate existing laws into
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climate change policy, but the operating assumption ought to be that this
catalyst function is no longer necessary in the Obama Administration working
in unison with Congress in its current political composition. Yet this is not
necessarily an unlimited window either politically or physically—action is
needed, and it is time to force agencies to act. But that force ought not come by
way of ad hoc litigation. Rather, Congress and President Obama should take
the bull by the horns by stopping mitigation litigation and requiring federal
agencies to get their heads out of the sand. One measure without the other will
produce a far less coherent national climate change policy, but putting both in
place will allow us to climb Mount Mitigation with a map to get us up and back
down with a purpose, not just because it’s there.

